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Kasi v. Angelone
300 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2002)
L Facts
On Monday, January 25, 1993, a lone gunman emerged from his car and
opened fire with an AK-47 assault rifle on a line of automobiles waiting to enter
the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). Two CIA employees, Frank Darling
("Darling") and Lansing Bennett ("Bennett") were killed, three other CIA
employees, Nicholas Starr, Calvin Morgan, and Stephen Williams were wounded.
All five victims were waiting to enter the CIA headquarters in Fairfax, Virginia,
in separate automobiles. The gunman, identified as MirAimalKasi ("Kasi"), also
known as Mir Aimal Kansi, fled the scene.'
Kasi, a native of Pakistan, was working as a driver for a local courier service
and lived in Reston, Virginia with a friend, Zahed Mir ("MNW). The day after the
shootings, Kasi fled the country for Pakistan and two days later, Mir filed a
missing person report. On February8,1993, the police searched Mir's apartment
and found the weapon used in the shootings. Kasi purchased the weapon in
Fairfax County three days prior to the crime.2
On February 16, 1993, Kasi was indicted in Virginia state court for the
following offenses: (1)"[c]apital murder of Darling as part of the same act that
killed Bennett;" (2) "murder of Bennett;" (3) "malicious woundings of Starr,
Morgan, and Williams;" and (4) five charges of using a firearm in commission of
the listed felonies? Thereafter, a United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern
District of Virginia issued an unlawful flight warrant for Kasi The CIA and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") began a widespread investigation to find
and return Kasi to the United States for trial.'
OnJune 15,1997, over four years later, FBI agents, including Agent Bradley
J. Garrett ("Garrett"), located and abducted Kasi from a Pakistani hotel room.
Upon abduction, Kasi "was hooded, shackled, and transported byvehicle and air

1. Kasiv. Commonwealth, 508 SE.2d 57, 59 (Va. 1998).
2. Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 490-91 (4th ar.2002).
3. Kz 508 S.E.2d at 59; VA. GCDE ANN. S 182-31(7) (lchie Supp. 2002) (stating that
"the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same act
or transaction constitutes capitalmurder); VA. GODE ANN. S 18.2-32 (Mlchie Supp. 2002) (defining
first and second degree urder and setting punishments for the class of felonies); VA. CODE ANN.
S 18.2-51 (Mchie 1996) (setting the punishment for malicious wounding as a class 3 felony; VA.
CODE ANN. S 18.2-53.1 (Michie 1996) (setting the punishment for the use of any firearm during
the commission of certain felonies).
4. K4z,300 F.3d at 491.
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to an undisclosed location where he was held in a jail-like facility."' During
Kasi's stay in the facility he was never interrogated or harassed by the FBI. He
was allowed to eat, drink
and sleep and the agents made sure he was treated
"fairly and humanely."6
After two days in the custody of FBI agents, Kasi was flown from Pakistan
to Fairfax County, Virginia, and jurisdiction was transferred to the Commonwealth of Virginia for prosecution! During the flight to the United States, Kasi
signed a written rights waiver form and orally confessed to Garrett. Kasi confirmed the purchase of the AK-47 rifle and ammunition. He confessed that he
was "upset" because U.S. aircrafts attacked parts of Iraq, that he was concerned
with the "killing of Pakistanians [sic] byU.S. components" and that he was upset
in particular "with the aA because of their involvement in Muslim countries."'
Kasi pleaded not guilty to the Virginia indictment and on November 10,
1997, the jury convicted him of all charges. On November 14, 1997, a capital
sentencing proceeding was held for the capital murder of Darling. The jury set
Kasi's punishment for the murder of Frank Darling at death. The state trial
court imposed the death sentence and the recommended sentences on the other
charges .

The Supreme Court of Virginia,on direct appeal, affirmed Kasi's conviction
and death sentence and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for
writ of certiorari. Kasi filed apetition for awrit of habeas corpus in the Supreme
Court of Virginia. The court dismissed his petition and denied rehearing and
again the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari."
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stayed
the state court's execution order and Kasi filed apetition for awrit of habeas
corpus in the district court. Kasi's petition raised three claims. First, Kasi argued
that based on the 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Pakistan the state trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him." This argument
had two prongs: first, Kasi claimed that his abduction and removal violated the
treaty and second, that because the United States began extradition proceedings
in 1993, it was limited to the extradition process." Kasi requested that the

5. I
6. Id at 496.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id at 491.
id
Id at 491-92.
Ksi, 300 F.3d at 492.
The Extradition Treaty between Palistan and the United States stated that the pernent

countries agree to return individuals who have committed murder or attempted murder in the
jurisdiction of the parties. Id at 495.

12.

Id at 493-98.
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sanction for the violation "should be [a] reversal of the capital murder conviction
and repatriation to Pakistan without prejudice for a new trial.""
The second claim Kasi made was also two pronged. First, Kasi argued that
he "mayhave been denied access to potentially exculpatoryevidence, in violation
of Brady v Mar)1nd" This claim was based on the fact that the trial court did
not enforce a subpoena of the FBI's investigation files because it lacked jurisdiction." Second, Kasi argued that under K* v WhiJy 6 the Commonwealth's
Attorney was required to conduct a Brady review of all of the federal files "in
order to locate and produce any exculpatory evidence that nigbt exist within
them"'7 Finally, Kasi contended that he was not given a fair trial, guaranteed
bythe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the state trial
court refused his request for individual voir dire of the jurors to determine
whether they had any knowledge of killings of Americans in Karachi, Pakistan,
which occurred during the trial."
The magistrate judge concluded that all three claims, although exhausted,
did not entitle Kasi to habeas relief. 9 The district court adopted the recommendation, dismissed the petition, and denied Kasi a certificate of appealability."
Kasi appealed the district court's denial to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Crcuit.'
I Hddig
The Fourth Crcuit found that the district court correctly denied Kasi's
petition for federal habeas relief, dismissed the appeal and denied his request for
a certificate of appealability" The court held the following: (1)the state trial
court did not lack jurisdiction over Kasi due to the forcible abduction of Kasi in
Pakistan, even if the United States had initiated formal extradition proceedings (2)the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to compel federal agencies to disclose
the subpoenaed documents and the Commonwealth's Attorney had no duty to
13. Id at 495.
14. Id at 500, Brady v. Maryland, 373 US. 83, 87 (1963) (holding "that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evience is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution*).
15. Kzi 300 F.3d at 500, 503.
16.
17.

514 US. 419 (1995).
Kz, 300 F.3d at 505; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US. 419, 437 (1995) (holding "that the

individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on
the government's behalf in the case, including the police").
18. K, 300 F.3d at 507.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id at 492.
Id
Id at490.
Id at 510.
Id at 500.
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review the files for Bradymaterial; 4 and (3) Kasi was not deprived of a fair trial
when the state trial court refused Kasi's request to conduct individual voir dire.2"

III. A m~sis
A. Extradition
The Fourth ircuit began by discussing four United States Supreme Court
cases. First, inKerv Illinois, 6 the Supreme Court decided that a "criminal defendant who has been ahkiiabythe United States from a foreign nation with which
the United States has an extradition treaty does not thereby acquire a defense to
the jurisdiction of the courts within this country."2" Second, in Frisbiev Ccdli*, 2
the Court held that the jurisdiction of a court to trya defendant is not frustrated
by the fact that the defendant was brought within the jurisdiction through
forcible abduction.' Third, in Unil Stae v Raudx,'° the Court held that a
defendant returned through extradition to the United States from a foreign
nation with which an extradition treatyexists mayonlybe tried for those
offenses
charged in the extradition request "until a reasonable time and opportunityhave
been given him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the
country from whose asyium he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings.",Finally, in UntheJStatsv A lawr-Madazmi, 32 the Court reconciled Ker and
Rausowrand noted that the express language of the treatyshould be considered."
Thus, to prevail on an extradition treaty claim, a defendant must demonstrate
that the "express language of a treatyand/or the established practice thereunder"
shows that "the United States affirmatively
agreed not to seize foreign nationals
3
from the territory of its treaty partner." '
24. Kzs4 300 F.3d at 504, 507.
25. Id
26.
119 US. 436 (1886).
27. K4 300 F.3d at 493; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (stating that forcible
removal of defendant from Peru did not subject defendant to illegal trial in Illinois).
28. 342 US. 519 (1952).
29. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US. 519, 522 (1952) (holding that the power of the court to trya
defendant is not
aired bythe fact that the defendant was brought within the court's jurisdiction
by reason of forcible abduction-).

30.

119 U.S. 407 (1886).

31. United States v. Rauscher, 119 US. 407, 430 (1886) (interpreting an extradition treaty
between the United States and Great Britain and holding that defendant can onlybe tried for those
crimes which are in the extradition request).

32.

504 U.S. 655 (1992).

33. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US. 655,664 (1992) (rejecting defendant's claim
that treaty between Mexico and United States prohibited forcible abduction because express
language of treaty"d[id] not purport to specifythe onlywayin which one countrymaygain custody
of a national of the other country for the purposes of prosecution").
34. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Gr. 1997) (stating that defendant
must demonstrate that the United States affirmatively agreed not to seize foreign nationals from
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The Fourth CGrcuit, relying on A lu

.MMadi summarized that although

terms set forth in the extradition treatymayregulate a court's abilityto prosecute

a defendant who has been returned to the United States in accordance with the
treaty, courts do not lack jurisdiction over a defendant whose abduction was not
expressly forbidden." The court conceded that there was no dispute that Kasi's
forcible seizure in Pakistan and return to the United States was not done pursuant to the extradition treaty in force between the United States and Pakistan.36
The Fourth Cicuit noted that the treaty did not specify the way in which one
countrycould acquire a national from the other countryfor purposes of prosecution."' The court stated that the location and abduction of Kasi by FBI agents
was not expresslyprohibited bythe extradition treatyand thus "did not divest the
Virginia state court of jurisdiction to try Kasi for the offenses committed in
Virginia."
The second prong to Kasi's claim is a contention that the documents he
presented to the district court demonstrated that the United States began extradition proceedings with the Pakistani government.39 Kasi argued that A lnzMadin did not apply because, unlike that case, extradition proceedings were
already initiated under the treaty.' Therefore, Kasi argued that the United States
was barred from forciblyabducting him and was required to complete the formal
extradition proceedings 4
The Fourth Circuit concluded that it need not address the second prong of
Kasi's claim. 42 The Fourth Ccuit stated that the evidence Kasi relied on at most
demonstrated that the United States issued a formal extradition request.43
However, nothing happened pursuant to the request" Relying on A humMaduv, the court noted that the extradition treatybetween the United States and
Pakistan does not state that once an extradition proceeding is initiated, the
measures set forth bythe treaty become the only way of transporting custody of
a criminal from one countryto the other." The court, relying on Uni Stae v
Chapa-Gza, 4 stated that even if Kasi's claim that the United States began
extradition proceedings was entertained, the extradition treatydid not address the
territory of its treatyparmer).

35.
36.
37.

Ksi 300 F.3d at 495.
Id at 496.
Id at 499.

38.
39.

Id

40.

Id at 498.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Ks4 300 F.3d at 498.
Id at 499.
Id

45.
46.

id
62 F.3d 118 (5th CAr. 1995).

Id at 497.

Id
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legality of forced abductions. 4 7 Thus, forcible abduction was not barred to the

United States as apossible method of transferring Kasi fromPakistan. 48 Furthermore, Kasi was not entitled repatriation to Pakistan under the extradition treaty
because he was not seized in violation of the terms of the treaty.49 Therefore, on
this issue, Kasi was not entitled to federal habeas relief.s
B. Brady Vidaziom
The Fourth Circuit next addressed Kasi's two pronged claim that his
constitutional right to obtain evidence was violated bythe trial court's refusal to
enforce a subpoena issued to the FBI and the Commonwealth's Attorney's
failure to investigate the FBI file for Brady material."s The FBI and other federal
agencies refused to comply with the subpoenas, asserting that "the state court
lacked jurisdiction to compel a federal custodian of records to comply with a
subpoena for documents obtained by the employee in the course of his official
duties." 2 The trial court agreed and refused to issue an order of contempt
because of its lack of jurisdiction. 3 The Fourth Circuit noted that the district
court's rejection of Kasi's Brady claim was correct because he could not specify
anypiece of evidence that mayhave been favorable to his defense or material to
his guilt or innocence."
However, the Fourth Ciuit found that the district court failed to address
the second prong of Kasi's argument- that the Commonwealth's Attorney was
required to review all of the federal files and therefore Kasi need not show the
existence of exculpatoryevidence under K*. s In K*,the Supreme Court held
that the prosecution is "assigned the... responsibility to gauge the likely net
effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of 'reasonable
probability' is reached." 6 Therefore, the prosecution should have knowledge of
evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf."'
Relying on K/*, Kasi argued that the Commonwealth's Attorney was
required to review all of the FBI files for possible Brady evidence."5 Kasi also
47. Ksi4 300 F.3d at 500; se United States v. CIhapa-Garza, 62 F.3d 118, 120-21 (5th Qr.
1995) (rejecting Almrz-Madmin claim and holding that extradition treaty does not govern the
legality of forced abductions).
48. S-Kasi, 300 F.3d at 500.
49. Id

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id
Id
Id at 501.
Id
Ki,300 F.3d at 505.
Id at 505.
K*, 514 US. at 437 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 US. 667,682-83 (1985)).
Id

58.

K 4 300 F.3d at 505.
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maintained that he need not demonstrate the existence of any exculpatory
evidence to prove aBrady violation, so long as he established that the prosecutor
did not review the files.59 Kasi asserted that no higher burden could be imposed;
if it were imposed "state criminal defendants will... be left with no mechanism
for obtaining exculpatory evidence.""
The Fourth Grcuit found procedural and analytical flaws in Kasi's argument. 61 The court found that because the Commonwealth has no authorityover
the FBI, the Commonwealth's prosecutor does not have authority to demand
access to FBI files in order to conduct aBrady examination.' In Uni Statz v
Wllam,6 the Fourth Grcuit provided an avenue for state criminal defendants
to obtain exculpatory evidence." The court held that astate criminal defendant
must seek investigative file materials from afederal agency in accordance with
appropriate agency regulations. 5 The court noted that the proper method of
judicial review of an agency's behavior isthrough the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA").6 The correct method requires the defendant to "assert his constitutional claim to the investigative information before the district court, which
possesses authority under the APA to compel the law enforcement agency to
produce the requested information in appropriate cases." 7 Kasi complied with
these requirements, but the district court rejected his request and set aside the
case."s The Fourth Crcuit noted that after Kasi's demands were rejected, he did
not attempt to appeal the decision of that ruling to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.' The Fourth Crcuit concluded that the
Supreme Court of Virginia did not err in rejecting Kasi's Brady claim and that
Kasi was not entitled to federal habeas relief on this issue."

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id
Id at 506.
Id
Id
170 F.3d 431 (4th ar.1999).
United States v. Wiliams, 170 F.3d 431,434 (4th Gr. 1999) (reiterating that a state court

lacks jurisdiction to compel the FBI to produce documents subpoenaed by a defendant in the

course of a state criminal prosecution").
65. Id at 433-34.
66.

K ,300 F.3d at 506; 5 US.C S 706(2)(A)-(B) (2000) (stating that district courts have

jurisdiction to reject agencyaction that is arbitray, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance W"i
law" including action "contraryto constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immnity); 5 US.C S 706(1) (2000) (vesting district courts authority to "compel agency action

unlawfuly wtQd or unreasonably delaied').
67.
68.

Wi/ian, 170 F.3d at 434; S 706(2)(A(B); see S 706(1).
Kasi, 300 F.3d at 506-07.

69.

Id at 507.

70.

Id
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al
VrDire

Finally, the Fourth Grcuit addressed Kasi's third claim- that he was
deprived of a fair trial because of the trial court's refusal to allow individual voir
dire of the jury members to determine if they had any knowledge of shootings
in Karachi, Pakistan." The court noted that voir dire is the principal means of
establishing an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.' However, the Fourth Crcuit also
stated that the trial court's discretion is broad with regard to voir dire."
The Fourth Grcuit held that a defendant does not always have a right to
specific questions concerning possible prejudices against him. 4 Furthermore, the
court held that an impartial jury can be constructed with "less than an inquiry
into a specific prejudice feared by the defendant."75 Accordingly, the trial court
need only provide
a voir dire that can sufficiently "uncover bias or partiality in
76
the venire."

The Fourth Cuvuit found that Kasi had not demonstrated that the jurors
knew of the Karachi killings. In so holding, the court stated that the trial
court's questions to the jurors, concerning possible exposure to media relating
to the case, were sufficient to ensure the absence of any bias or prejudice in the
jury.7 Thus, the Fourth Gircuit concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow individual voir dire and rejected federal habeas
relief on this issue as well.'
IV. Appla inm
V,mm
The "informal" extradition that Kasi was subjected to is legal in all but two
situations. First, a defendant extradited pursuant to an extradition treatycan only
be tried for those offenses for which he was extradited."0 Attorneys representing
extradited defendants should ensure that the charges do not exceed those upon
which the extradition was based. In addition to its substantive effect, extradition
71. Id at 509-10.
at 509; U.S.
CONST.trial,
amend.
("In alljury
criminal
the accused
the 72.
right toId
a speedy
and public
by anVI
impartial
of theprosecutions,
State and district
whereinshall
the enjoy
crime
shall have been committed."); US. CONsT. amend. XIV, S 1 (No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunkiies of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
73. Ku, 300 F.3d at 509.
74. Id (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 US. 589,595 (1976)).
75. Id (quoting Ristai* 424 U.S. at 595).
76. Id at 509-10 (quoting United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,739-40 (4th Cr. 1996)).

77.

Id at 510.

78.
79.
80.

Id
Kai 300 F.3d at 510.
Raxdwr, 119 US. at 430.
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mayalso control penalty. Manycountries will not extradite defendants who face
the death penalty in the United States. For example, Jens Soering, a German
national who was charged with capital murder in Virginia, was arrested in England." After protracted litigation, including a decision by the European Court
for Human Rights, 2 Soering was extradited only after the British government
received assurances that he would not face the death penalty.s3 Soering was
convicted and sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. 4
The second exception relates to the holding in A lhrz.Madmih defendants
cannot be forcibly abducted if the treaty expressly forbids forcible abduction."5
Therefore, practitioners dealing with an abducted client should carefullyreview
the treaty governing the abduction to ascertain whether it is prohibited. Additionally, practitioners should note that state courts do not lack jurisdiction over
a defendant whose abduction was not expressly forbidden. 6
The Brady issue presented in the case is limited to its facts. In order to
conduct a judicial review on matters relating to agencysubpoena noncompliance,
the proper method is through the APAY The APA provides a procedure "for
judicial review of a decision bya federal agency" to retain investigation materials,
in which the defendant "can proffer any perceived rights to the file materials
under the constitutional principles set forth in Brady and its progeny." 8
Finally, the defense counsel in this case correctlyobjected to the trial court's
refusal to allow individual voir dire.' The objection preserved the issue for
further review.9 Counsel's failure to object will default the issue for anyfurther
81. Soering v. Deeds, No. 99-6498,2000 WL 870490, at **1 (4th Cr.2000) (affirming district
court's judgment denying Soering's application for writ of habeas corpus). In Virginia, this multiple

murder fell under Code Section 182-31(7) and made Soering eligible for a ital murder charge.
VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(7) (Mchie Supp. 2002) (defining capital
r as -(tlhe willful,

deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same act or transaction-).
82. Soe
v.United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H. (Ser. A)(1989) (holding that death row
conditions a 2e a and degading).
83. Richard B.Lillich, The Soeng~
C 85 AM. J. INTrL L. 128, 137, 141 (1991) (analyzing

Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. C. H.R. (set. A)(1989)); seeRe Soering, 1990 WL 754501 at
*1(Q.B. Div'1 C. 1990); Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex Parte Soering, 1988 WL 623814
at *1 (Q.B. Divl C. 1988).

84.

Lillich, s"r note 83, at 130. The European Court relied on a report written by the

European Commission for Human Rights regarding Soering's concern that there was a serious

likelihood that he would be sentenced to death in the United States if extradited directlyfrom Great

Britain. Id
85.
86.

Alwvvz-Madi 504 US. at 664.
Kzi, 300 F.3d at 495.

87. Id at 506; S 706 (1)-(2).
88. Ki, 300 F.3d at 506; S 706 (1)-(2).
89. Ki, 300 F.3d at 507.
90. VA. SUP. Ci'. R. 5:2.5 (Error will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial court...
unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling...").
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review."1 Kasi's situation was atypical because of the timing of the request to the
trial court. A vigilant practitioner will attempt to prevent bias throughout trial
and not just at initial voir dire. Thus, practitioners in this position should request
individual voir dire and, in the alternative, make a motion for mistrial to preserve
the issue for later review.
IV. CQnksion
The Fourth Crcuit, in denying federal habeas relief to Kasi, clarified points
relating to extradition, Brady material, and individual voir dire. Attomeys must
be mindful of the treaty governing extradition to ascertain whether forcible
abduction is permitted. Also, practitioners must follow APA procedure, which
confers on district courts authorityto set aside agency action, to review a Brady
claim. Following the strategyof the defense counsel in Kaz54 practitioners should
request individual voir dire at any point at which bias or prejudice may arise or
make a motion for mistrial to preserve the issue for later review.
VI Epk
On November 14,2002, Mr Aimal Kasi was executed bylethal injection at
the Greensville Correctional Center.' On the afternoon of his death, Mark
Warner, Governor of V'iini, denied Kasi's clemency request- a clemency
request supported bythe government of Pakistan.93 On the same day, the United
States Supreme Court also rejected Kasi's final appeal. 4
Priya Nath

91.

Id; see Schmitt v. Commonwealh, 547 SEl2d 186, 194 (Va. 2001) ("Because Schmitt

failed to mae ... objections in the trial court, he has waived these issues on appeal.").
92. Maria Glod &Eric Weiss, KziExiaiForCYA S/a,
WASI-L POST, Nov. 15,2002,
at Al.

93.
94.

Id at A23.
Id

